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ABSTRACT 
One of the keystones of the smart city is the transportation. The railway is the crucial part in the main public- 
and also the goods-transportation today, and the significance will be constantly growing. Nowadays the increase 
in threats and decrease in the sense of security generates a high need for designing smart and multi-level 
integrated security systems on the railway stations. The security risk of these territories has risen in the last 
years, because the public transportation plays an important role in the lives of nowadays people and will grow in 
the future. That means a rise in incidences of robbery, vandalism and even terrorism. The integration of the 
conventional systems gives more possibility and reliability for the facility management and the end-users to 
prevent the aforementioned incidences. The power of the complex (human-electrical-mechanical) system can be 
usable if in the central monitoring station only qualified and well trained operators work. Because of the 
difficulty of the multi-level integrated security systems, without suitable and well-trained users and operators the 
efficiency of the security decrease. Furthermore, the efficiency of the complex system can be lower than the 
unintegrated conventional realizations, so that’s why it is needed to integrate special smart functions. 
Managing the smart complex security systems on the aforementioned railway stations are difficult due the 
human factor and the large number of connections and internal processes. However, the recently created and 
improved probabilistic approach- and fuzzy system can be a useful mathematical solution for the 
aforementioned cases. These methods can be used in the full scaled security system, if first – like the Fuzzy 
logic – an expert level analysis gives enough information about the crucial parts of the system. With them comes 
the possibility to give- and get data from the determined system, and continuously recalculate the factors and - 
in some cases – it can be done On-Line, too. It helps to generate and send prompt information to the facility 
management, and with it can maximize the fully functional operational efficiency and reduce the hazards. 
This article gives a useful guideline for the facility management of the smart cities’ railway stations. It declares 
the main connections with theirs hazards to find the key elements and the in-, and outbound parameters of the 
smart complex security system. The generated knowledge base will contain also more additional information 
about the efficient- and the improvement of the system, too. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays the smart city is one of the most mentioned expression what can be found 
everywhere, but the real extent is un-, or poorly-defined. Everybody has only a feeling of it. 
One can find the broad, data-driven and the citizen-focused definitions depending on which 
sector is in the focus. There definitions rarely include liveability and sustainability [1]. 
The transportation is one of the keystones of the nowadays cities, where the railway is the 
crucial part in the main public and also the long distance goods transportation, and the 
significance will be constantly growing. The new smart cities also need these service, but 
with optimized function on a minimized territory is an essential condition, what concentrates 
the quantity of the travellers and the value of the goods, too. The security risk of these 
territories has risen in the last years, because the public transportation plays an important role 
in the lives of nowadays people and will grow in the future. That means a rise in incidences 
of robbery, vandalism and even terrorism, so to prevent these actions it is needed to design, 
and operate a complex security system on these areas. In this case the meaning of the complex 
expression is a hard connected human-, electrical (multi-level integrated security system), 
and mechanical protection. The integration of the conventional systems gives more 
possibility and reliability for the facility management and the end-users to prevent the 
aforementioned incidences. The power of the complex (human-electrical-mechanical) system 
can be usable if in the central monitoring station only qualified and well trained operators 
work. Because of the difficulty of the multi-level integrated security systems, without suitable 
and well-trained users and operators the efficiency of the security decrease. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of the complex system can be lower than the unintegrated conventional 
realizations, so that is why it is needed to integrate special smart functions. 
Managing the smart complex security systems because of the aforementioned reasons is 
difficult due to the human factor and the large number of connections and internal processes. 
In this article we show and test more mathematical functions and methods that can be usable 
in the full scaled security system of the Facility Management. 
THE RAILWAY STATION’S ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
The stations comprise diverse outdoor and indoor facilities, many of them work 7/24. On the 
railway stations there is a crucial need to guard passengers, employees, goods, infrastructure, 
and assets against possible threats. These facilities in particular have become at least as 
vulnerable as airports. They must therefore meet very demanding criteria with regard to 
security, safety, communications, and building automation – also to uphold their reputation as 
providers of safe, well-organized services that travellers and freight forwarders can rely on [2]. 
The aforementioned enviromental risk generates security challanges of the complex system, 
such as preventing and responding vandalism, robberies, sabotage and terrorism. When the 
security challenges are succesfully met, it gives employees and passangers confidence in the 
safety of train stations [3]. 
DETERMINING AN OPERATIONAL MODEL OF THE STATION’S COMPLEX 
SECURITY SYSTEM 
The designing-, installating-, and finalizing-term of the security system is only the begining, 
since the facility management has to operate it constantly 7/24. It cannot be done without 
specialized and expert employees at the economy and at the security part, too. To prevent the 
mailfunctions and get the highest efficiency of the system it is needed to generate a special 
pointer what can show the momentary state of the complex security system. 
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For the pointer generation the first step is to determine the inputs, the variables, the outputs 
and the functions of the security system on the station with their inner connections. With the 
aforementioned elements the operation diagram of the station’s global security system is 
shown in Figure 1. The model is designed for the inner connections of the global security 
system. The arrows represent the connection and the direction, the bulk of the area represents 
the importance of the subsystem. 
 
Figure 1. The model of the complex security system on a railway station. 
Wthin a station, five independent security parts can be found: the mechanical protection, the 
access control system, the electrical protection system, the human security system and the 
integrated security supervisor centre (ISSC). In the system architecture an undetermined 
protection subsystem the Information Technology area can be found. It is not part of the 
protection but it has connected to all protection subsystems and it is also connected to the 
outer area, that means it is one of the most significante part of the complex protection system. 
The following security subsystems will determine the efficiency of the complex system. 
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The mechanical protection subsystem 
To prevent the unauthorized entrance to a secured area it is needed to install special 
mechanical elements lattices, security foils to the windows and doors, bars and traffic control 
devices to the vehicle entrances, and locks for all places where higher risk is possible. These 
devices are the background of the complex protection. 
The access control subsystem 
The access control system is the bridge between the mechanical and the electrical protection 
system. It is neither mechanical, nor electrical part, but both. The main function is preventing 
the unauthorized entrance to the restricted area, but it also generates alarm signals to the ISSC. 
It is not only for controlling the traffic but it also stores all information with time-stamps in 
non-volatile memory at the controlled area and also send them into the supervisor system. 
The electrical protection subsystem 
The electrical protection subsystem contains the video surveillance, the burglar alarm, the 
gate-phone systems. These systems are working together and some inputs and outputs of the 
access control is integrated here through the ISSC, too. It means a burglar alarm signal can 
occur a video event, so the connected camera will display on the alarm monitor and also can 
generate an access control event where all connected electric locks are disabled, only the 
security guards are allowed to pass through these gates.  
The human security guard and patrol subsystem 
The human security of the complex system is the most important sector, because without any 
physical force there can’t be an efficient security system. There are two independent part of 
it, the first part is for the building security, they stand on a pre-defined place (eg. on the 
passenger and the industrial entrances of the railway stations) of the area and check the traffic 
and operate the mechanical-, the electrical-, and the access control-systems. The other part of 
the human security is the patrol. They are well trained guards divided into small teams. They 
patrol the area, to prevent the hazards of unattended baggage, unauthorized entrance. Theirs 
official uniform and the physical demonstrative presence gives the opportunity of the secure 
feeling in the area what can reduce the hazards possibility. In an unexpected event the ISSC 
can send these teams immediately and directly to the risk to prevent or to solve problems. For 
the efficient managing of this system we need a hierarchical structure with well-defined 
information and command routes. 
The integrated security supervisor centre’s subsystem 
The ISSC is for the efficient operation of the protection, what collects all information 
connected to the protection in the inner and outer area and converts them into the same 
protocol. With the converted and pre-analysed signals can coordinate with the subsystems. 
It can be seen that the subsystems can work together without ISSC, but in this case because of 
the low level integration the efficiency of them is poor. To prevent any security hazard or 
bomb attack, it needs an efficient multilevel (low and high) integrated protection system with 
well-educated and well-trained operators, patrols and security guards. Without the suited 
trainings it can occur that the efficiency of the complex system is lower than the separated 
and low level integrated systems, in a disaster because of the latent of the secure feeling the 
response can be slow or wrong. 
PROBABILITY TREE AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
To determine all functions with the risk factors in the smart complex security systems on the 
aforementioned railway stations are very difficult due to the human factor and the large 
G. Liebmann, L. Hanka and Gy. Schuster 
346 
number of connections and internal processes. However, the recently created and improved 
probabilistic approach with fuzzy system expert analysis is a useful mathematical solution for 
the aforementioned cases. These methods can be used in the full scaled security system, if 
first – like the Fuzzy logic – an expert level analysis gives enough information about the 
crucial parts of the system. With them comes the possibility to give and get data from the 
determined system, and continuously recalculate the factors and – in some cases – it can be 
done On-Line, too. The best method for modelling the aforementioned multi-level integrated 
system is the fault tree diagram. It is used to conduct fault tree analysis (or FTA). 
The FTA is a technique for reliability and safety analysis. The Bell Telephone Laboratories 
developed the concept in 1962 for the US Air Force for use with the Minuteman system. It 
was later adopted and extensively applied by the Boeing Company. The fault tree analysis is 
a symbolic analytical logic technique found in operations research and in system reliability. 
The FTA helps determine the cause of failure or test the reliability of a system by stepping 
through a series of events logically. The benefits of fault trees is that a fault tree creates a 
visual record of a system that shows the logical relationships between events and causes lead 
to that failure. The modularising of the FTA gives the opportunity to reduce the number of 
inputs and define them in blocks. The modularising has to be done before the analysis takes 
place [4]. It helps in computerising the FTA and helps also the facility management quickly 
understand the results of the analysis and pinpoint weaknesses in the design and identify 
errors. A fault tree diagram will help prioritize issues to fix what occur the failure. In many 
ways, the fault tree diagram creates the foundation for any further analysis and evaluation. 
For example, when changes or upgrades are made to the system, you already have a set of 
steps to evaluate for possible effects and changes. You can use a fault tree diagram to help 
you design quality tests and maintenance procedures. It is a good pointer that can show the 
state of the whole complex system. 
TESTING THE COMPLEX SYSTEM’S FTA FOR EFFICIENCY METHOD 
We made a complex system model of the railway station to test our efficiency computing 
method. We designed an event buffer on the test complex protection system, what have 
recorded all important events for a month, after it we have analysed all the events, with that 
data we could make three different groups that can be used for templates. We hope that these 
templates will give a fast method of the average efficiency measurement about the system. In 
the test month we recorded the following events in the event buffer: external buildings false 
alarms (infra beam detectors outside) occurred 10 times, external buildings false alarms 
(inside) 5 times, false fire alarms 5 times, stolen mobiles (office area) 3 times, while stolen 
official stamp and other devices and/or purse (no recorded data) occured 3 times. There was 
no recorded data for stolen purse, drug usage signs and for poisonous chemical stolen from a 
technical area. 
The first event group contained data that is not directly connected to the complex system 
(events coming from outside only for redundant recording). The early recognition of these 
events will be important to reduce the mathematical analysing speed in the future, so they 
will not go through the FTA analyse method. They will not be dropped, because these items 
can be used for “no need for FTA analysing” template. These items were in our test system 
e.g. the false fire events, because these events also came into the human protection system but 
only for redundant recording. 
The second event group contained data that is directly connected to the complex system and 
the occurrence was only one or maximum two times, so these data cannot be used for 
templates in the future but can significantly modify the efficiency of it (e.g. stolen chemicals, 
drug usage signs, etc.). 
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The third event group contained data that is directly connected to the complex system and the 
occurrence was more than two times, so these data can be used for templates in the future 
(e.g. external building false alarms inside and outside). 
We generated blocks from the complex system elements to reduce the FTA diagrams size, 
without generating false information in the system, because the aforementioned – fuzzy logic 
style – expert level analysis gives enough information about the crucial parts of the system. 
We could define the fault probability average rate for each subsystem’s device of the test 
system, because of more than 10 years’ operational experience in these mechanical and electrical 
protection systems and more than 4 years’ operational experience in these human systems. 
We made all FTA diagrams for the aforementioned second and third event groups. We made 
the fault analysis and counted all probability of them, we followed step by step and we got 
that the probability of fault is between 0,26 and 0,39 the efficiency of the system is between 
0,61 and 0,74. 
In our test system the following event occurred: From the technical area of the protected 
station a poisonous chemical was stolen. In that area there are access control system, but this 
room was not protected, there was a video-surveillance system, but in that room there weren’t 
cameras, the nearest cameras were on the corridor and showed common view about the 
traffic. On the corridor an access control system can be found, and there was patrol, and at the 
building’s entrance a security checkpoint, too. 
The FTA diagram of the event can be seen in Figure 2. The core event can occur by only the 
Mechanical Protection System Fault – the doors lock fault, or the employee did not use it – 
but for the post analysing the other subsystems proper protection efficiency is needed. This is 
one side why we have used it for the FTA all the three other subsystems, and in the future with 
the FTA refining will give the possibility for the facility management to generate additional 
suggestions about the system’s improvement. The defined access control subsystem fault 
probabilities were the following: Reader 0,03, Control Panel 0,01 and Electric Lock 0,05. The 
Access Control Fault probability can be calculated by the following formula: 
 𝑃𝑇 = 1 −∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑖) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑃1)
𝑛
𝑖=1 (1 − 𝑃2)… (1 − 𝑃𝑖)] (1) 
 
Figure 2. An example event FTA diagram. 
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The calculated probability of this subsystem was PT = 0,083. 
The defined electrical protection subsystem fault probabilities were the following: camera 
0,1, DVR 0,05 and transmission network 0,05. The counted probability of this subsystem was 
PT = 0,18775. 
The defined mechanical protection subsystem fault probability were the following: lock 0,01, 
and user 0,1. The calculated probability of this subsystem was PT = 0,109. 
The defined human protection subsystem fault probability were as follows: guard 0,02 and 
patrol 0,01. The coalculated fault probability of this subsystem was PT = 0,0298. 
The accumulated fault probability indicator number was in this event PT = 0,356139, so the 
efficiency indicator was 1 – PT = 0,64386. 
The analysis showed that the stolen events fault probability rate was the same in the tested 
complex system, because of the connected subsystems and was not related to the fact that the 
owner left it unattended or not. 
More than 50 events can be recorded in this period and most of them can be used as a 
template because of the frequently occurrence. 
In our test system an unneeded patrol usage event occurred 10 times. More building area have 
been protected by a burglar alarm system after working hours. This building has in-, and 
outside area with different sensors. In Figure Error! Reference source not found. can be 
seen the unneeded patrol usage frequent event’s FTA diagram. In this situation the core event 
can occur only by the Electrical Protection System Fault (an opened window/door, a false 
PIR signal, a control panel hazard, or a noise in the communication circuit), but there is 
another subsystem what can occur as an unneeded operation, the Ctral Supervision System 
Fault. The defined electrical protection system fault probabilities were the following: 
 
Figure 3. A frequent example event. 
user 0,05, detector 0,15, control panel 0,03 and transmission 0,01. The Electric Protection 
System Fault probability can be calculated wth expression (1). The calculated probability of 
this subsystem was PT = 0,220561. 
The defined central supervision system fault probabilities were the following: display 0,05 
and user 0,1 so the calculated probability of this subsystem was PT = 0,145. 
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The accumulated fault probability indicator number was in this event PT = 0,33358, while the 
efficiency indicator number was 1 – PT = 0,66642. 
In the test system the FTA showed that in this kind of fault group the probability rates are the 
same and independent of the fault’s place, so they could be used as a template in future. 
With the aforementioned FTA diagrams we could declare the weighted global indicator 
number of the complex system, what was PT = 0,3483 and the global weighted average 
efficiency number was 1 – PT = 0,6516. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The mentioned theoretical, logical and mathematical methods can give a useful information 
about the complex system’s efficiency. 
This article gives a useful guideline for the facility management of the smart cities’ railway 
stations. It declares the main connections with their hazards to find the key elements and the 
inbound and outbound parameters of the smart complex security system. The pre-generated 
knowledge base and FTA templates gives the opportunity to get a main view of the global 
system’s efficiency. If a special self-learning software algorithm will be used at the analysis 
and with a special maintenance and repairing contract, what contains also a system 
improvement agreement, it gives the possibility that the efficiency of the full scaled complex 
system will be continuously in the optimal state. 
The facility management always gets on-line information about the state of the system with 
the needs of the improvement and also the cost, that means the management gets all 
important information for the proper budget planning for years and gets the ability to reduce 
the security risk of the smart cities’ stations. 
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